A search occurs where the state invades a reasonable expectation of privacy. An expectation of privacy is reasonable where the public’s interest in being left alone by the government outweighs the government’s interest in intruding on the individual’s privacy to advance its goals, notably those of law enforcement (Hunter, at pp. 159-60). Courts analyze an expectation of privacy by considering many interrelated but often competing factors, which can be grouped together under four categories: (1) the subject matter of the search; (2) the claimant’s interest in the subject matter; (3) the claimant’s subjective expectation of privacy; and (4) whether the subjective expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable (Spencer, at para. 18, citing Tessling, at para. 32).
Section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
Search or seizure
Section 8 protects reasonable expectations of privacy against state searches and seizures. The threshold depends on the circumstances, including what information the state seeks and what it can reveal. Where section 8 applies, the search or seizure must have lawful authority, that law must be reasonable, and the search must be carried out reasonably. Prior authorization is ordinarily required where feasible; warrantless powers have specific conditions and limits. The excerpts below cover general principles, digital information and consent, and selected police powers. Regulatory context can affect the assessment but does not remove the need for safeguards. A breach does not automatically exclude evidence: exclusion is a separate question under section 24(2).
8: Search or seizure
Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.
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The following selected judicial passages discuss Section 8.
Privacy and justification
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A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable. The Crown must establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the search was reasonable. A search is reasonable if it is authorized by a reasonable law and conducted in a reasonable manner (Campbell, at para. 81, citing R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, at p. 278; see also Evans, at para. 23).
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I recognize that it may not be reasonable in every instance to insist on prior authorization in order to validate governmental intrusions upon individuals’ expectations of privacy. Nevertheless, where it is feasible to obtain prior authorization, I would hold that such authorization is a precondition for a valid search and seizure.
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This Court has generally declined to set out a “hard and fast” test of reasonableness: see Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, Restrictive Trade Practices Commission), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425, at p. 495. In my view, this flexible approach remains compelling. This Court has nonetheless identified certain considerations that may be helpful in the reasonableness analysis, including “the nature and the purpose of the legislative scheme . . . , the mechanism . . . employed and the degree of its potential intrusiveness[,] and the availability of judicial supervision”: Del Zotto v. Canada, [1997] 3 F.C. 40 (C.A.), per Strayer J.A., in dissenting reasons adopted by this Court in [1999] 1 S.C.R. 3.
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Digital information and consent
In my view, Cole cannot be distinguished on this basis. There was no suggestion in Cole that the school could not consent to the search because it had no equal and overlapping privacy interests in the computer. While Gravelle undoubtedly has constitutionally-protected privacy interests in the shared computer, this does not entitle her to relinquish Reeves’ constitutional right to be left alone (Cole, at para. 78; see also Borden, at p. 162). Waiver by one rights holder does not constitute waiver for all rights holders. This Court has set a high bar for first-party consent because waiving s. 8 rights has significant consequences (Borden, at p. 162). It insists that consent must be informed and voluntary because it wants to ensure that a waiver by the holder of a Charter -protected right is an expression of his or her free will. Allowing Gravelle’s consent to waive Reeves’ rights is completely inconsistent with this jurisprudence.
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A warrant usually provides a legitimate prior justification for the intrusion, thereby satisfying the first requirement of the plain view doctrine. This is not the case, however, where police officers carry out a search unreasonably. In the context of digital searches, the prior justification extends only to the types of files that are “reasonably necessary” for the proper execution of such a search (Vu, at para. 22). In other words, there must be a reasonable nexus between the files examined and the purposes of the warrant for a search to satisfy the first requirement of the plain view doctrine.
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Limits on police search powers
In summary, a search of a home incident to arrest for safety purposes will comply with s. 8 of the Charter when the following requirements are met: (1) The arrest was lawful. (2) The search was incident to the arrest. The search will be incident to arrest when the following considerations are met: (a) Where the area searched is within the arrested person’s physical control at the time of the arrest, the common law standard must be satisfied. (b) Where the area searched is outside the arrested person’s physical control at the time of the arrest — but the area is sufficiently proximate to the arrest — the police must have reason to suspect that the search will further the objective of police and public safety, including the safety of the accused. (3) Where the area searched is outside the arrested person’s physical control at the time of the arrest — but the area is sufficiently proximate to the arrest — the nature and the extent of the search must be tailored to the purpose of the search and the heightened privacy interests in a home.
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To summarize, police officers will not be justified in searching a cell phone or similar device incidental to every arrest. Rather, such a search will comply with s. 8 where: (1) The arrest was lawful; (2) The search is truly incidental to the arrest in that the police have a reason based on a valid law enforcement purpose to conduct the search, and that reason is objectively reasonable. The valid law enforcement purposes in this context are: (a) Protecting the police, the accused, or the public; (b) Preserving evidence; or (c) Discovering evidence, including locating additional suspects, in situations in which the investigation will be stymied or significantly hampered absent the ability to promptly search the cell phone incident to arrest; (3) The nature and the extent of the search are tailored to the purpose of the search; and (4) The police take detailed notes of what they have examined on the device and how it was searched.
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The general duty of officers to protect life may, in some circumstances, give rise to the power to conduct a pat-down search incident to an investigative detention. Such a search power does not exist as a matter of course; the officer must believe on reasonable grounds that his or her own safety, or the safety of others, is at risk. I disagree with the suggestion that the power to detain for investigative searches endorses an incidental search in all circumstances: see S. Coughlan, “Search Based on Articulable Cause: Proceed with Caution or Full Stop?” (2002), 2 C.R. (6th) 49, at p. 63. The officer’s decision to search must also be reasonably necessary in light of the totality of the circumstances. It cannot be justified on the basis of a vague or non-existent concern for safety, nor can the search be premised upon hunches or mere intuition.
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In sum, I conclude that, in order for a warrantless entry to satisfy s. 11(7), the Crown must show that the entry was compelled by urgency, calling for immediate police action to preserve evidence, officer safety or public safety. Further, this urgency must be shown to have been such that taking the time to obtain a warrant would pose serious risk to those imperatives.
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In light of the serious infringement of privacy and personal dignity that is an inevitable consequence of a strip search, such searches are only constitutionally valid at common law where they are conducted as an incident to a lawful arrest for the purpose of discovering weapons in the detainee’s possession or evidence related to the reason for the arrest. In addition, the police must establish reasonable and probable grounds justifying the strip search in addition to reasonable and probable grounds justifying the arrest. Where these preconditions to conducting a strip search incident to arrest are met, it is also necessary that the strip search be conducted in a manner that does not infringe s. 8 of the Charter .
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