This appeal requires this Court to decide whether s. 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms protects corporations from cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. Like our colleagues, we conclude that it does not, because corporations lie beyond s. 12’s protective scope. Simply put, the text “cruel and unusual” denotes protection that “only human beings can enjoy”: Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, at p. 1004. The protective scope of s. 12 is thus limited to human beings.
This Court’s jurisprudence on s. 12, in both its French and English versions, is marked by the concept of human dignity, as our colleagues have noted. And the existence of human beings behind the corporate veil is insufficient to ground a s. 12 claim of right on behalf of a corporate entity, in light of the corporation’s separate legal personality. Like our colleagues, and contrary to the majority at the Court of Appeal, we therefore reject the proposition that the effect of a corporation’s bankruptcy on its stakeholders should be considered in determining the scope of s. 12.
Section 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
Treatment or punishment
Section 12 protects everyone from cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. Its protection centres on human dignity: punishment may violate it because it is grossly disproportionate in a particular case or inherently incompatible with human dignity. These passages explain who can claim the right, what counts as treatment or punishment, and how the protection applies to sentencing, detention, financial penalties and extradition.
12: Treatment or punishment
Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.
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The following selected judicial passages discuss Section 12.
Who and what Section 12 protects
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There must be some more active state process in operation, involving an exercise of state control over the individual, in order for the state action in question, whether it be positive action, inaction or prohibition, to constitute "treatment" under s. 12 .
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State action is considered to be punishment for the purposes of s. 12 if it “(1) . . . is a consequence of conviction that forms part of the arsenal of sanctions to which an accused may be liable in respect of a particular offence, and either (2) . . . is imposed in furtherance of the purpose and principles of sentencing, or (3) . . . has a significant impact on an offender’s liberty or security interests” (R. v. Boudreault, 2018 SCC 58, [2018] 3 S.C.R. 599, at para. 39, quoting R. v. K.R.J., 2016 SCC 31, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 906, at para. 41).
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Human dignity and the constitutional standards
In sum, a punishment may infringe s. 12 for two distinct reasons, either because it is grossly disproportionate in a given case or because it is intrinsically incompatible with human dignity. Where both prongs of the protection of s. 12 are in issue in the same case, the analysis of the nature of the punishment must precede that of gross disproportionality. If the punishment that might be imposed is cruel and unusual by nature, and hence intrinsically incompatible with human dignity, it will be unnecessary — and I would even say pointless — to consider whether it is grossly disproportionate in a given case, because a punishment that is cruel and unusual by nature will “always be grossly disproportionate” (Smith, at p. 1073; see also Kerr and Berger, at p. 238).
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To ensure respect for human dignity, Parliament must leave a door open for rehabilitation, even in cases where this objective is of minimal importance. Offenders who are by chance able to rehabilitate themselves must have access to a sentence review mechanism after having served a period of incarceration that is sufficiently long to denounce the gravity of their offence. This last point is important, as Parliament has latitude to establish sentences whose severity expresses society’s condemnation of the offence committed, and while such sentences may in some circumstances have the effect of dooming offenders to die behind bars, they are not necessarily contrary to s. 12 of the Charter.
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Mandatory minimum sentences
To assess whether a mandatory minimum violates s. 12 of the Charter, this Court has developed a two-stage inquiry that involves a contextual and comparative analysis (Bissonnette, at para. 62). A court must: 1. Assess what constitutes a fit and proportionate sentence having regard to the objectives and principles of sentencing in the Criminal Code (Bissonnette, at para. 63; Boudreault, at para. 46; Nur, at para. 46). 2. Consider whether the impugned provision requires the imposition of a sentence that is grossly disproportionate, not merely excessive, to the fit and proportionate sentence (Bissonnette, at para. 63; Nur, at para. 46; Smith, at p. 1072). The constitutional bar is set high to respect Parliament’s general authority to choose penal methods that do not amount to cruel and unusual punishment.
This two-part assessment may proceed on the basis of either (a) the actual offender before the court, or (b) another offender in a reasonably foreseeable case or hypothetical scenario (Bissonnette, at para. 63; Nur, at para. 77).
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The scope and reach of the offence, the effects of the penalty on the offender, and the penalty are three main components that will have a bearing on the gross disproportionality analysis. In some cases, one alone could lead to a conclusion of gross disproportion. Other times it will be the combination of or interplay between these components which will contribute to a finding of gross disproportion or constitutional compliance. For example, a broad licensing offence with a small penalty may not undermine human dignity as much as a true criminal offence that attaches a significant penalty to less blameworthy conduct.
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When the analysis is conducted with the assistance of a situation other than that of the offender challenging the constitutionality of a minimum sentence, it can be difficult to decide on a particular scenario. Useful guidance has, however, been provided by this Court: (i) The hypothetical must be reasonably foreseeable; (ii) Reported cases may be considered in the analysis; (iii) The hypothetical must be reasonable in view of the range of conduct in the offence in question; (iv) Personal characteristics may be considered as long as they are not tailored to create remote or far‑fetched examples; and (v) Reasonable hypotheticals are best tested through the adversarial process. (Hills, at para. 77)
Given the view of the law proposed by my colleagues, it appears necessary to review the way in which our case law has characterized what constitutes a reasonably foreseeable scenario. In the context of an analysis under s. 12 of the Charter, the term “scenario” encompasses both the circumstances of the commission of the offence and the personal characteristics of the accused. These two elements must be reasonably foreseeable. I will examine each of them in turn.
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The argument of the Attorneys General of Canada and Ontario, however, goes further. They seek to insulate otherwise unconstitutional laws through the exercise of prosecutorial discretion as to when and to whom the laws apply. But unconstitutional laws are null and void under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 . The Attorneys General’s argument is essentially the converse of a constitutional exemption. As I observed on behalf of a unanimous Court in Ferguson, “[t]he divergence between the law on the books and the law as applied — and the uncertainty and unpredictability that result — exacts a price paid in the coin of injustice”: para. 72. It deprives citizens of the right to know what the law is in advance and to govern their conduct accordingly, and it encourages the uneven and unequal application of the law. To paraphrase Ferguson, bad law, fixed up on a case-by-case basis by prosecutors, does not accord with the role and responsibility of Parliament to enact constitutional laws for the people of Canada: paras. 72-73.
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The application of the six-month minimum sentence increases the proposed five-month sentence slightly. However, the additional month cannot be regarded as causing him substantially greater harm. We are a long way here from the hypothetical scenario in Bertrand Marchand, where the fit and proportionate sentence for the youthful offender was a conditional discharge (para. 130; compare also Senneville, at para. 99). In those two cases, there was a very sharp contrast between the minimum sentences of six months’ and one year’s incarceration, respectively, and a discharge. The same cannot be said here. The one-month difference in this case is not such as to shock the conscience of Canadians.
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After analyzing the three components of gross disproportionality, we cannot conclude that, in the case of the sixth scenario, the six-month sentence would be “so excessive as to outrage standards of decency”, would be “abhorrent or intolerable” to society or would “shock the conscience” of Canadians (Hills, at para. 109). While the six-month minimum sentence is certainly not entirely proportionate, it falls far short of meeting the test for gross disproportionality, which, we reiterate, is a demanding standard. Accordingly, the mandatory minimum sentence does not infringe s. 12 of the Charter, and there is therefore no need to consider whether this infringement is justified under s. 1.
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Detention and segregation
The principles underlying Lyons must be adapted in the case at bar to the immigration context, which requires a period of time for review of the named person’s right to remain in Canada. Drawing on them, I conclude that the s. 7 principles of fundamental justice and the s. 12 guarantee of freedom from cruel and unusual treatment require that, where a person is detained or is subject to onerous conditions of release for an extended period under immigration law, the detention or the conditions must be accompanied by a meaningful process of ongoing review that takes into account the context and circumstances of the individual case. Such persons must have meaningful opportunities to challenge their continued detention or the conditions of their release.
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The motion judge repeatedly referred to “seriously mentally ill” inmates in his findings. He clearly appreciated that all of the SMI Inmates suffered from serious, active, ongoing mental illnesses. It was in respect of that specific group the motion judge found any time spent in administrative segregation constituted cruel and unusual treatment.
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We would not interfere with the motion judge’s holding that the s. 7 and s. 12 rights of the SMI Inmates were breached when those inmates were placed in administrative segregation.
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Financial penalties and extradition
I conclude that the victim surcharge scheme, although intended to achieve a valid penal purpose, violates s. 12 in the case of offenders like Mr. Boudreault, Mr. Larocque, and Mr. Michael. It leaves sentencing judges with no choice. They must impose the surcharge in every case. They cannot consider the most marginalized offenders’ inability to pay, the likelihood that they will face a repeated deprivation of liberty for committal hearings, or the indefinite nature of the punishment. They cannot apply the fundamental principles of sentencing, seek to foster rehabilitation in appropriate cases, or adjust the sentence for Indigenous offenders. To return to the ultimate question in these appeals, the impact and effects of the surcharge, taken together, create circumstances that are grossly disproportionate, outrage the standards of decency, and are both abhorrent and intolerable. Put differently, they are cruel and unusual, and, therefore, violate s. 12.
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In our view, the degree of causal remoteness between the extradition order to face trial and the potential imposition of capital punishment as one of many possible outcomes to this prosecution make this a case more appropriately reviewed under s. 7 than under s. 12 . It must be kept in mind that the values underlying various sections of the Charter , including s. 12 , form part of the balancing process engaged in under s. 7 . In Kindler, supra, both McLachlin J. and La Forest J. specifically recognized that s. 12 informs the interpretation of s. 7 : Kindler, supra, at pp. 831 and 847; Schmidt, supra, at p. 522; Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, supra; R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151.
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